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T"ederal Indian law has had a strange history that dates
I back to the foundational cases known as the Marshall
FTrilogy. Even though observers subject federal Indian
law to rightful criticisms about the use of law to legitimize
a colonial state, the dispossession of Indian lands, the de-
struction of tribal cultures, and the exploitation of Indian
people, many Indian law cases-at least until the last few
decades-are simple decisions upholding a clear rule of
law. Classic cases involved recognizing tribal treaty rights,
invalidating state and local governments' actions to tax
tribal lands in blatant violation of federal law, and, more
recently, acknowledging the federal government's awe-
some failure to account for individual Indian trust ac-
counts. These cases stand for the proposition that political
power, wealth, and influence do not always run
roughshod over the rights of weaker and poorer individu-
als and groups-a pillar of our democracy and a staple of
our judicial system's respect for the rule of law. 2
The long history of the cases involving Indian law
heard by the U.S. Supreme Court has seen the develop-
ment of a settled common law of federal Indian law. The
foundational principles that guided the Marshall Court re-
main the same principles that form the basis for Indian
law today. Justice Antonin Scalia's praise of predictability
and certainty as a hallmark of the rule of law in this con-
text is noteworthy. The main actors in federal Indian
law-Indian tribes, the United States, and the states-
have long litigated their disputes in the context of these
famous foundational cases.
But Indian law stands in an awkward place in this mo-
ment of the Supreme Court's history. Even as Justice Brey-
er accepted the 2007 American Bar Association's "Rule of
Law" Award after a Supreme Court term that saw the
overruling or severe degradation of several precedents in
the areas of abortion rights, standing to sue, and school
desegregation, 3 the rule of law in federal Indian law had
been under siege for more than two decades. The recent
decisions that appear to be a shock to some observers
pale in comparison to the Supreme Court's decades-long
assault on the rule of law in federal Indian law cases. This
article offers a description of the most egregious instances
in which the Court has run roughshod over tribal sover-
eignty and Indian rights, with nary a peep of warning or
objection from the larger legal establishment.
The first part of this article deals with Worcester v. Geor-
gia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832) and describes how federal Indian
law is based on a rule of law significant enough, at one
time, to all but save the Union. A brief history of the cases
that helped to define the rule of law in Indian law through
the 1980s follows. This part also explains, in general
terms, how the Supreme Court's Indian law jurisprudence
has degraded into a jumble of confusion and obfuscation
since the late 1980s. At least since 1988, the Court has
ruled against tribal interests about 75 percent of the time.
The second part of this article highlights several important
cases and details the way the Supreme Court has ignored
the rule of law in its Indian law jurisprudence.
The Rule of Law in Federal Indian Law
Application of the Rule of Law to Save the Union:
Worcester v. Georgia
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832), was a critical
foundational case of federal Indian law that established
the Supreme Court's recognition of tribal sovereignty,
treaty rights, and the exclusion of state law from Indian
country. Justice Breyer has been outspoken about this all-
but-unknown case; he is also one of only three living cur-
rent or former justices (including Justice O'Connor and
Chief Justice Roberts) to have visited Indian country. It
appears, however, that Justice Breyer's real reason for
mentioning Worcester might have been to expound on
the fragile character of judicial supremacy in the federal
system of the United States. 4
The facts of the case in the context of the national poli-
tics of 1832 illuminate Justice Breyer's discussion. Legal
historians agree that the Court must have had Georgia's
historic defiance of the Supreme Court and federal law in
mind when they decided Worcester. A year before the
events leading to Worcester occurred, the state of Georgia
had defied a Supreme Court order staying the execution
of a Cherokee man, George Corn Tassel, by the state for
murder by executing the man almost as soon as they re-
ceived the order staying the execution, thus rendering the
case academic. The state legislature then ordered the gov-
ernor and state officers to disregard future Supreme Court
orders implicating state sovereignty.5
Worcester v. Georgia, the case that arose immediately
thereafter, involved four missionaries whom Georgia had
convicted and sentenced to several years of hard labor for
violating a state law that prohibited white men from set-
ting foot in Cherokee Nation territory. The law, part of a
whole series of laws aimed at destroying the Cherokee
Nation as a viable political presence in Georgia, violated
federal treaties between the federal government and the
Cherokee Nation. The case had powerful implications for
federal Indian law, but those concerns were secondary to
the broader constitutional concerns of the supremacy of
federal law over conflicting state law and the question of
the enforceability of Supreme Court mandates.
Justice Breyer's comments highlighted the apparent
disconnect between the story of Worcester as commonly
told and the likely political reality of the aftermath of the
case. The common story is that the Marshall Court's deci-
sion in Worcester was a shock to the nation's leaders, es-
pecially President Andrew Jackson, the so-called Indian
Fighter who was well known for his opposition to Indian
rights. President Jackson was said to have uttered, "John
Marshall has made his decision, now let him enforce it."
Perhaps the President said this, perhaps he did not. What
is clear from the historical record, as Justice Breyer point-
ed out, is that, even though President Jackson had no
duty to force the state of Georgia to comply, he informal-
ly requested Georgia's governor to follow the Supreme
Court's order. Why? Other Southern states (in particular,
South Carolina) had chosen to follow Georgia's lead in re-
fusing to comply with both Supreme Court orders and
acts of Congress. This refusal was an act that even Presi-
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dent Jackson, the ardent states' rights advocate and South-
erner, could not countenance. Later, in correspondence to
Justice Story, Chief Justice Marshall remarked, with no
small amount of relief and with a little gallows humor,
that President Jackson had become the ultimate national-
ist-an honorary Federalist: "Imitating the Quaker who
said the dog he wished to destroy was mad, they said An-
drew Jackson had become a Federalist, even an ultra-Fed-
eralist. To have said he was ready to break down and
trample on every other department of the government
would not have injured him, but to say that he was a Fed-
eralist-a convert to the opinions of Washington, was a
mortal blow under which he is yet staggering."6
Justice Breyer has observed that the Indian law ques-
tions forming the basis for Worcester required the
Supreme Court to confront two difficult questions. First, to
uphold the plain meaning of the 1785 Treaty of Hopewell,
the Court had to apply the Supremacy Clause to strike
down Georgia statutes and court decisions conflicting
with the treaty. This is a simple application of the Consti-
tution and, hence, the rule of law. Second, once the Court
issued this controversial ruling, the state of Georgia had to
comply with the order. And, with President Jackson's be-
hind-the-scenes actions backing the Court, the ultimate
outcome in Worcester was an amazing triumph for the
rule of law in the face of powerful political opposition. It
is no wonder that Justice Breyer is infatuated with the
case.
The Rule of Law Holds... Until the Rehnquist Court
The instances of the Supreme Court's application of
federal Indian to uphold the rule of law are numerous, al-
though much of the whole field from 1832 to 1959 is ob-
fuscated by poorly reasoned decisions and racism, exem-
plified by cases such as Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United
States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955), and United States v. Kagama,
118 U.S. 375 (1886). Several important cases still form im-
portant pillars of Indian law and demonstrate the prece-
dence of the rule of law over powerful political interests.
The first case in the so-called modern era of federal In-
dian law is Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959), in which
the Court held that tribal courts had exclusive jurisdiction
over civil disputes arising in Indian country involving trib-
al members as defendants. This mild decision gave rise to
some shock waves because of its resurrection of founda-
tional Indian law principles that modern legal commenta-
tors thought had somehow dissipated.7 Other cases fol-
lowed the Williams decision, such as Menominee Tribe of
Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968), in which the
Court held that tribes' treaty rights survived congressional
termination of a tribe. In another case, Central Machinery
Co. v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 448 U.S. 160 (1980),
the Court ruled that federal Indian law pre-empts levying
state taxes on business activities in Indian country. The
Court decided other important cases involving Indian law:
for example, Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49
(1978), recognizing the immunity of tribal sovereignty im-
munity, and Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe of Indians,
471 U.S. 195 (1985), acknowledging independent power
of tribes to impose taxes. The number of important cases
upholding the rule of law in this period is too substantial
to recount here. According to Professor Alex Skibine,
from 1968 to 1987, "[a]ll in all, tribes lost some significant
cases, but they won substantially more than they lost."
Since 1987, however, Professor Skibine writes that tribes
have won only 11 of the 48 Indian law cases decided by
the Court, with four being neutral and 33 being losses.8
Since the October 1996 Supreme Court term, a party
opposing tribal interests that loses at the lower court level
but files a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court
has a 16.2 percent chance of having that decision re-
versed by the Supreme Court (that is, there have been 17
victories in the Supreme Court out of 105 certiorari peti-
tions). A party representing tribal interests that loses at the
lower court level and files a petition for certiorari. has a
3.3 percent chance of convincing the Court to reverse the
lower court's adverse judgments (or four winning
Supreme Court rulings out of 121 certiorari petitions).
Convincing the Supreme Court to hear a case is almost
the entire battle, given the fact that the Court reverses the
lower court in the vast majority of cases it hears. But Indi-
an tribes are able to convince the Court to grant a petition
for certiorari only about 4 percent of the time, whereas
state governments can do so 32 percent of the time.9
These numbers show a striking contrast.
Since the publication of Felix S. Cohen's Handbook of
Federal Indian Law in the 1940s, the field of federal Indi-
an law has focused on three foundational principles:
" Indian affairs are the exclusive province of the federal
government;
" state authority does not extend into Indian country;
and
" Indian tribes retain significant inherent sovereign au-
thority unless it is extinguished by Congress.
These principles serve as a broad statement of the rule
of law in federal Indian law. Since the late 1980s, most of
the Supreme Court's Indian law decisions have ignored
these foundational principles. According to an Eighth Cir-
cuit judge who was reversed by the Court in a major Indi-
an law case, United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004), the
Supreme Court makes up Indian law as it goes. The situa-
tion has gotten so bad for tribal advocates that a great vic-
tory for Indian country in the 21st century consists of con-
vincing the Court not to grant certiorari. 10 What changed?
Federal Cases Involving Indian Law
The degradation of federal Indian law has come in fits
and starts since the late 1980s. Several cases are worth
mentioning as examples of cases in which the majority
opinion in a Supreme Court decision involving Indian law
has deviated in an often outrageous manner from the rule
of law. The disregard for the rule of law in the Court's In-
dian cases can be categorized as follows: (1) ignoring the
rule of law and (2) eliminating the rule of law.
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Ignoring the Principles of Indian Law
The first category of cases includes those in which the
majority decision of the Court failed to address relevant
Indian law principles altogether. Professor Lawrence
Lessig's short article, How I Lost the Big One, in which he
discusses his advocacy before the Supreme Court in El-
dred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003), offers an example of
how the Supreme Court can ignore seemingly applicable
principles. Professor Lessig wrote, "I first scoured the ma-
jority opinion, written by Ginsburg, looking for how the
[C]ourt would distinguish the principle in this case from
the principle in [United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549
(1995)]. The reasoning was nowhere to be found. The
case was not even cited. The core argument of our case
did not even appear in the court's opinion."'1 The cases
discussed below are similar to Eldred.
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996)
Of all the cases discussed in this article, perhaps Semi-
nole Tribe v. Florida is the most obvious example of a
major Indian law decision that ignored the rule of law in
Indian law. The case involved Congress' attempt to use its
power under the Commerce Clause to try to abrogate sov-
ereign immunity, as provided by the Eleventh Amend-
ment, in the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (25 U.S.C.
§ 2701 et seq.). The critical legal question identified by
Chief Justice Rehnquist was whether Congress had the au-
thority to waive state sovereign immunity under the
Eleventh Amendment. In the Indian Gaming Regulatory
Act, Congress had attempted to exercise its authority un-
der the Indian Commerce Clause. Rather than delve into
the Court's precedents about the scope of congressional
authority under the Indian Commerce Clause or even the
framers' views of the clause, Chief Justice Rehnquist's ma-
jority opinion offered no discussion whatsoever about
congressional authority under the Indian Commerce
Clause. Instead, the opinion focused on precedents (and
some legal history) relating to the Interstate Commerce
Clause, first noting that the Court had recognized Con-
gress' authority to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immuni-
ty in only two circumstances-in accordance with 5 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment and in accordance with the
Interstate Commerce Clause. The opinion glossed over
congressional authority under the Indian Commerce
Clause, treating that rich and varied history as all but irrel-
evant and choosing, instead, to focus on the lone Inter-
state Commerce Clause case that had recognized congres-
sional authority to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immu-
nity: Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion overruled that case, at-
tacking the rationale of Justice Brennan's plurality opinion
on numerous grounds. At that point, given that the Court
denied Congress authority under the Interstate Commerce
Clause to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity (be-
cause that clause was one conceivable source of congres-
sional authority to deal with Indian gaming), the logical
next question would be whether the Indian Commerce
Clause supplied Congress that authority.
Put simply, the Court refused to answer that question,
concluding in Seminole Tribe (without citation or analysis)
that "[i]f anything, the Indian Commerce Clause accom-
plishes a greater transfer of power from the States to the
Federal Government than does the Interstate Commerce
Clause." But then the Court refused to disclose just how
much or what kind of authority Congress had under the
Indian Commerce Clause vis-'-vis the Eleventh Amend-
ment, asserting that "[Tihe plurality opinion in Union Gas
allows no principled distinction between the Indian Com-
merce Clause and the Interstate Commerce Clause." This
is a classic non sequitur.
If the Supreme Court had been serious, it should have
engaged in a rigorous analysis of the scope of congres-
sional power under the Indian Commerce Clause. A quick
review of the issues covered at the Constitutional Conven-
tion provides evidence that the Indian Commerce Clause
could be interpreted in a manner different from the way
both the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Clauses could
be interpreted: the framers drafted the Indian Commerce
Clause for different reasons from those used for the other
two Commerce Clauses and, perhaps as a result, added
the clause to the Constitution much later in the conven-
tion. According to Professor Albert Abel,
The provision for regulation of commerce with for-
eign nations and among the several states had been
published by the committee of detail two weeks,
and definitely approved by the convention two
days, before the subject of the Indian trade was in-
troduced on the floor of the convention. It was not
until several days later that the latter reported out of
committee, still encumbered with some of the quali-
fications attached to it in the articles; and less than
two weeks before the close of the convention that it
was finally incorporated with the rest of the com-
merce clause and approved in the form with which
we are familiar. By this time, the larger part of the
discussion in the federal convention relative to com-
mercial regulations was over, and in that which did
take place later there is no language relating even
remotely to Indian trade. 12
After listing the evidence, Professor Abel concludes,
"Whatever regulation of commerce might mean in con-
nection with transactions with the Indians, it was so dis-
tinct and specialized a subject as to afford no basis for ar-
gument as to the meaning of the rest of the clause." 13
Moreover, the framers intended Congress' authority over
Indian commerce to extend beyond mere "commerce." As
Professor Robert Stern has argued, the framers intended
the Constitution to serve as a "fix" on the problem of the
Articles of Confederation, which had allowed the states to
muddy the waters of federal policy related to Indian af-
fairs policy. Stern asserts that "the whole spirit of the pro-
ceedings indicates that ... the draughtsmen meant com-
merce to have a broad meaning with relation to the Indi-
ans ..." In fact, Stern acknowledges that "[tihe exigencies
of the time may have called for a more complete system
of regulating affairs with the Indians than of controlling
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commerce among the states ... ,,14
In short, the outcome of the Seminole Tribe case-and
the fate of an important provision in the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act-rested with the Court's treatment of a
case interpreting the Interstate Commerce Clause, instead
of the Indian Commerce Clause.
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n,
485 U.S. 439 (1988)
In Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n,
tribal interests attempted to prevent the U.S. Forest Ser-
vice from constructing a road through an area in northern
California that is sacred to the Yurok, Karuk, and Tolowa
Indians. Conceding that the construction of the road
would be "devastating" to the religion (but doubting that
it would "doom" the religion), Justice O'Connor's majority
opinion focused on two points: (1) The federal govern-
ment owned the land at issue, and the Court was op-
posed to outsiders' attempts to control federal land proj-
ects. (2) The majority in the case was concerned that the
Court would be forced to choose one religion over anoth-
er, second-guess the salience of religious belief, or inter-
pret the religious tenets of unfamiliar religions. The Court
noted that validating the tribe's claim would result in a sit-
uation in which "government[s] ... were required to satis-
fy every citizen's religious needs and desires."
But foundational principles of federal Indian law
would have required the Court to address the possibility
that, in the case of the California Indians, the United
States may have agreed via treaty that these specific Indi-
an religious practices or these Indian lands must be pro-
tected from federal interference. That possibility might
have required the Court to address the sticky question of
the Treaty of Guadalupe Hildalgo and the subsequent un-
ratified treaties with California's Indians that had been
drawn up in the 1850s. 15 The Court, of course, did not do
so in its decision in the Lyng case.
The difficult hypothetical pragmatic questions that
caused Justice O'Connor's concern would not have arisen
in this context, nor would this case have constituted a
precedent for any other kind of case involving religious
freedom. Rather than deal with the rights of communities
and people who have a special relationship with the Unit-
ed States under foundational federal Indian law, the Court
grouped tribal interests into the same category as the
Catholic Church or the legalization of marijuana, neither
of which were affiliated with political entities that had a
treaty relationship with the United States.
Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 126 S. Ct.
676 (2005)
In Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, the
Supreme Court ignored the entire terrain of argumentation
offered by both parties and decided the matter by con-
cluding that principles of federal Indian law did not apply
at all. In the Wagnon case, the state of Kansas had im-
posed a tax on non-Indian distributors of gasoline sold on
the Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation's reservation at a gas
station owned by the nation. In accordance with prior
Supreme Court precedent, the Prairie Band Potawatomi
Nation sold its gas at the fair market rate (by imposing a
tribal tax on the gas) in order to avoid what the Court had
previously condemned in Washington v. Colville Confed-
erated Tribes, 447 U.S. 134, 155-157 (1980), as "marketing
the exemption." The state's tax had the effect of destroy-
ing the market rate, because it brought about double taxa-
tion on the tribe's gas sales. The Prairie Band Potawatomi
Nation won a decision in the Tenth Circuit that federal
law pre-empted imposition of the state's tax. Both the
state and the Indian nation agreed that the pre-emption
test would apply to the dispute. The state's argument rest-
ed on two major points: either the lower court had misap-
plied the pre-emption test or, alternatively, the Supreme
Court should overrule the pre-emption test.
Given that the Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation had
specifically patterned its taxing and gas sales scheme after
clear Supreme Court precedent, it was no surprise that the
Tenth Circuit had ruled in favor of the nation. But the
Supreme Court avoided the problem of the pre-emption
test by refusing to apply it at all.16 Considering that the
Court had been applying the pre-emption test for a long
time--the same test that the lower court and all the par-
ties agreed was applicable-to state taxes in cases such as
Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi
Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505 (1991), and Ramah Navajo
School Board v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832 (1982),
for the Supreme Court to simply state that the test did not
apply at all is disingenuous as best.
Eliminating the Principles of Indian Law
Some principles of federal Indian law have not sur-
vived the Supreme Court's handling of cases involving In-
dian law. In these cases, the principles appeared to have
been settled law for long periods of time until the Court
announced new principles that contradicted the settled
law. It was easier for the Court to subvert the rule of law
in these cases, because no explicit precedent appeared to
be on point. Several examples are discussed below.
City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197
(2005)
In City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, the
Supreme Court held that the "settled expectations" of
non-Indian property owners and state and local govern-
ments justified the application of equitable defenses such
as laches, impossibility, and acquiescence to Indian claims
of sovereignty. The Second Circuit then applied the
broadest reading of the reasoning of the Sherrill Court to
dismiss Indian land claims on appeal in which the Cayuga
Indian Nation had won at the trial court level more than
$200 million in damages and interest against the state of
New York and several of its political subdivisions. In oth-
er words, any older claim to land, treaty rights, or sover-
eignty-no matter what its merit might be-could be sub-
ject to equitable defenses favoring non-Indian property or
governmental interests.17
The Supreme Court's opinion first relied on the case of
Felix v. Patrick, 145 U.S. 317 (1892), in which the Court
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had held that an individual land claim was invalid be-
cause of laches, ignoring that the case being heard in-
volved the land claim of a sovereign. Moreover, the Court
ignored a more recent case that was directly on point
(Ewert v. Bluejacket, 259 U.S. 129 (1922)), holding that eq-
uitable defenses do not apply to tribal claims. The Court
had faced this exact question in a previous case (County
of Oneida, N. Y. v.
Oneida Indian Nation
of N.Y., 470 U.S. 226
(1985)), which in-
volved the same par-
ties over similar claims
and had relied on
precedent to reject the
equitable defenses.
Justice Stevens, who
had dissented in the
older case, ironically
dissented again in City
of Sherrill, criticizing
the Court for ignoring
foundational principles
of Indian law. The
Court also ignored the
Indian Claims Limita-
tion Act of 1982, Pub.
L. 97-394, codified at
28 U.S.C. 5 2415(b), ex-
pressing a policy of ex-
tending the statute of
limitations for Indian
land claims.
But the key viola-
tion of the rule of law
occurred when the Supreme Court rewrote the law of
laches related to tribal interests-as opposed to every oth-
er category of plaintiff-to apply even when the tribal
plaintiff had taken every conceivable action to prosecute
the claims. Moreover, the state and local government peti-
tioners never raised the defenses of laches in their open-
ing briefs, waiting until the reply brief to raise the ques-
tion, thus denying the Oneida Indian Nation the opportu-
nity to respond to it in writing. And, other than a brief
question with no follow-up from Justice Scalia, there was
no mention of laches during oral argument. 18
In addition, City of Sherrill raises the issue of the
breadth of the Supreme Court's reasoning. Given the exis-
tence and potential of massive claims for reparations
winding their way through federal courts, Justice Gins-
burg's reasoning in City of Sherrill could apply with equal
force to non-Indian reparations claims in which any "set-
tled" property interests are at risk. The City of Sherrill
opinion serves, in some ways, as the legal implementation
of philosophical objections to ancient claims. City of Sher-
rill may be the first shot off the bow in a larger repara-
tions debate, and the ruling could be a signal that massive
reparations are not forthcoming from this Supreme
Court. 19
United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978): Implicit
Divestiture
Much has been written about the subject of the
Supreme Court's application of a little-known doctrine
of federal Indian law known as "implicit divestiture,"
and little more discussion is required here. The Court's
application of implicit divestiture reflects a complete
collapse in the rule
of law in Indian law
cases. Foundational
principles of federal
Indian law provide
that there are two
ways an Indian tribe
can "lose" portions
of its inherent au-
thority to govern,
such as the power to
prosecute non-Indi-
ans. First, the tribe
can bargain away
portions of its sover-
eignty, usually via a
treaty; one example
of this is the right to
declare war or en-
gage in international
relations. Second,
Congress can unilat-
erally divest the tribe
of portions of its sov-
ereignty, as it did in
when it extended
state criminal juris-
diction into parts of
Indian country. 20
But the Supreme Court has arrogated to itself a third
means of divesting tribal sovereignty-the application of
implicit divestiture-when the Court stated in United
States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978), that it has the
power to locate "that part of sovereignty which the Indi-
an implicitly lost by virtue of their dependent status."
(Emphasis added.) What the Court meant by "dependent
status" is wholly unclear, although, in the first modern
case applying implicit divestiture, then Justice Rehnquist's
opinion relied on the legislative history of congressional
bills that were never enacted and opinions of the Interior
Department's solicitor that had been withdrawn. At first,
the Court retreated from this broad, standardless state-
ment of when tribal sovereignty may be implicitly divest-
ed, ruling in Washington v. Colville Confederated Tribes,
447 U.S. 134 (1980), that it would apply the implicit di-
vestiture doctrine only when "the exercise of tribal sover-
eignty would be inconsistent with the overriding interests
of the National Government." (Emphasis added.) Never-
theless, the number of times the Court has applied the
doctrine has exploded in the past three decades. Prior to
1978, the Supreme Court had exercised this "power" ex-
actly once: in Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1832), the
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Court held that Indian tribes do not have the power to
alienate land absent the consent of Congress. Since 1978,
the Court has applied this "power" more than a half-
dozen times.2 1
San Manuel Bingo & Casino v. NLRB, 475 F.3d 1306
(D.C. Cir. 2007).
The Supreme Court's abdication of the rule of law in
Indian law cases has had an effect on the lower courts.
In San Manuel Bingo & Casino, the National Labor Rela-
tions Board reversed almost 30 years of its own adminis-
trative precedent and held that the National Labor Rela-
tions Act (NLRA) applies to all tribal business activities.
The D.C. Circuit upheld the board's decision. It should
be noted that Congress had enacted this legislation in
1935, one year after passing the Indian Reorganization
Act, making it plausible (if not likely) that Congress nev-
er intended for the NLRA to apply to Indian tribes or
their businesses. Because of the meager number of tribal
businesses in 1935, Congress would not have considered
the NLRA to be a burden on them. And, despite the ab-
solute lack of any amendments to the NLRA in relation to
tribes, the judiciary has amended the statute to apply to
tribes. 22
Conclusion
In an increasing number of Indian law cases-with
Seminole Tribe and Lyng as prime examples-the
Supreme Court has ignored federal Indian law altogether
in its reasoning. In more and more Indian law cases-
with City of Sherrill and Wagnon being of importance-
the Court has surprised the parties in the case by basing
its reasoning on areas of law not even briefed by the par-
.ties and by completely ignoring relevant precedent. The
Supreme Court's purported application of the rule of law
is blunted by statistics as well, with tribal interests having
a 3 percent chance of reversing a negative decision
reached by a lower court and litigants who oppose tribal
interests having a 16 percent chance of reversing a nega-
tive outcome. In the past two decades, tribal interests
have lost 75 percent of their cases before the Supreme
Court, reversing the prior trend of the Court's findings in
favor of tribal interests in slightly more than half its cases.
Where is the rule of law here?
Justice Breyer's statements on the fragility of our con-
stitutional system come at an important time, given the
current trends in the Court's decision-making. Perhaps of
all the Supreme Court justices on the Court, only Justice
Breyer is aware of the role that federal Indian law has
played in the development of the legitimacy of the rule of
law in our constitutional system. Even though federal In-
dian law may be a relatively ignored area of law--too dif-
ferent and too complex to attract the attention of main-
stream Court watchers-federal Indian law offers a fright-
ening glimpse of the future of the Supreme Court's view
of the "rule of law." TFL
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